



The International
Political Economy
of New Regionalisms Series

Exploring the New South American Regionalism (NSAR)

Edited by Ernesto Vivares, FLACSO, Ecuador

The events and processes taken place in the last decade in South America has given way to one of the most interesting regional phenomena under a global crisis and within a changing world order. From the traditional status of Washington's backyard and reign of economic and political stability, South America has increasingly turned into a region marked by a heterodox development in the light of other dominant regional tendencies of development – the Europe Union, NAFTA and the Asia Pacific. The new South American regionalism (NSAR) is far from the dominant academic and official interpretations of the major dominant regional projects.

Given the reach and scope of the existent literature on the topic of the NSRA, there is an important gap concerning its academic exploration in relation to its nature of development, political economic complexity, challenges and orientations. In this sense, this book explores, from a wider and pluralist political economic perspective, the developmental dimensions of the NSRA within a changing hemispheric and world order in transformation. It analyses a set of specific debates: regionalism in the Americas then and now; social and economic development and regional integration; and organized crime, intelligence and defence. An in depth and critical reflection on the complex and heterogeneous path of regionalization taking place in South America from different perspectives and in key issues of regional development.

This much-awaited book is the most impressive account of the regional dynamics of development in South America in recent decades. In a balanced way, it uncovers how the region is reconfigured by forces and changes from inside as well as outside the region. The book is also a major contribution to "new" and comparative regionalism more broadly. It is crucial reading for anyone who can accept that South American regionalism is not simply an emulation of regional projects and models in other parts of the world.

Fredrik Söderbaum, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and
United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS)

South America is undertaking daunting challenges in the politics of development. This book shows us what is at stake in the multiple areas of region building.

Diana Tussie, FLACSO, Argentina

ASHGATE

Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East, Union Road,
Farnham, Surrey,
GU9 7PT, England

www.ashgate.com

ISBN 978-1-4094-6959-9



9 781409 469599



ASHGATE

Exploring the New South American Regionalism (NSAR)

Ernesto Vivares

Exploring the New South American Regionalism (NSAR)

Edited by Ernesto Vivares

The International
Political Economy
of New Regionalisms Series

EXPLORING THE NEW SOUTH
AMERICAN REGIONALISM (NSAR)

The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series

The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series presents innovative analyses of a range of novel regional relations and institutions. Going beyond established, formal, interstate economic organizations, this essential series provides informed interdisciplinary and international research and debate about myriad heterogeneous intermediate-level interactions.

Reflective of its cosmopolitan and creative orientation, this series is developed by an international editorial team of established and emerging scholars in both the South and North. It reinforces ongoing networks of analysts in both academia and think-tanks as well as international agencies concerned with micro-, meso- and macro-level regionalisms.

Editorial Board

Timothy M. Shaw, Visiting Professor, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA

Isidro Morales, Director, EGAP, Gobierno y Política Pública, Campus Estado de México and Director, Foreign Policy Edición Mexicana

Maria Nzomo, University of Nairobi, Kenya

Nicola Phillips, University of Sheffield, UK

Johan Saravanamuttu, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Fredrik Söderbaum, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden and UNU-CRIS, Belgium

Recent titles in the series (continued at the back of the book)

Mapping Agency

Comparing Regionalisms in Africa

Edited by Ulrike Lorenz-Carl and Martin Rempe

China's Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa

Edited by Seifudein Adem

Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia

The Role of SAARC

Zahid Shahab Ahmed

Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the 21st Century

Insights from the Global South

Edited by Emmanuel Fanta, Timothy M. Shaw and Vanessa T. Tang

Exploring the New South American Regionalism (NSAR)

Edited by

ERNESTO VIVARES
FLACSO, Ecuador

ASHGATE

© Ernesto Vivares and the contributors 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Ernesto Vivares has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work.

Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East
Union Road
Farnham
Surrey, GU9 7PT
England

Ashgate Publishing Company
110 Cherry Street
Suite 3-1
Burlington, VT 05401-3818
USA

www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

Exploring the new South American regionalism (NSAR) / by [edited by] Ernesto Vivares.
pages cm.—(The international political economy of new regionalisms series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4094-6959-9 (hardback)—ISBN 978-1-4094-6960-5 (ebook)—

ISBN 978-1-4094-6961-2 (epub) 1. Regionalism—South America. 2. Regionalism—
Economic aspects—South America. 3. Economic development—South America. 4. South
America—Economic integration. 5. National security—South America. 6. Unión de
Naciones Suramericanas. I. Vivares, Ernesto.

HC165.E97 2013
337.1'8—dc23

2013020851

ISBN 9781409469599 (hbk)
ISBN 9781409469605 (ebk – PDF)
ISBN 9781409469612 (ebk – ePUB)

Contents

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	vi
<i>List of Contributors</i>	ix

Preface	xiii
<i>Anthony Payne</i>	

Introduction: Contours of the New South American Regionalism	1
<i>Ernesto Vivares</i>	

PART I: THINKING AND CONCEPTUALIZING ABOUT REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS

1	Toward a Political Economy of the New South American Regionalism	9
	<i>Ernesto Vivares</i>	
2	The Origins of the Union of South American Nations: A Multicausal Account of South American Regionalism	29
	<i>Carlos Espinosa</i>	
3	Washington and the New South American Regionalism	49
	<i>Francisco Carrión Mena</i>	
4	East Asian Economic Cooperation: Lessons for South American Regionalism	65
	<i>John Wong</i>	

PART II: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

5	The Need for a New South American Economic Regionalization	91
	<i>Renato Baumann</i>	
6	Incorporation and Regionalism in Latin America	113
	<i>Juliana Martínez Franzoni and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea</i>	
7	Rescaling Responsibilities and Rights: The Case of UNASUR Health	129
	<i>Pía Riggirozzi</i>	
8	Global Contexts and Challenges of Building a Regional Governance of Social Policy and Its Implications for South America	147
	<i>Nicola Yeates</i>	

**PART III: BROADENING REGIONALISM: CRIME, INTELLIGENCE,
AND DEFENSE**

9	Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: UNASUR Perspectives <i>Daniel Pontón</i>	163
10	Defense and the New South American Regionalism: Exploring New Conditions and Perspectives on Defense in South America <i>Germán Montenegro</i>	183
11	Trends, Strategic Tension, and Cooperation in Security and Intelligence in the Andean Region <i>Fredy Rivera Vélez</i>	197
	<i>Conclusion</i>	213
	<i>Bibliography</i>	219
	<i>Index</i>	243

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

4.1	Japan-Led “Flying Geese” Pattern for EA-I’s Growth and Integration	70
4.2	China’s Economic Growth and Inflation 1978–2010	73
4.3	China’s Trade Balance with Selected Economies	74
4.4	The Pattern of China-Led Regional growth and Integration	74
4.5	Comparing East Asian Economies, 2010	76
4.6	GDP of East Asia, Japan, China and the United States since 1980	78
5.1	Asia and Latin America—Intraregional Trade Intensity Index— Producer Goods—1992–2008	99
5.2	Asia and Latin America—Intraregional Trade Intensity Index— Other Goods—1992–2008	99
5.3	Asia and Latin America—Export Concentration Index—Intraregional Trade in “Other” Goods—1992–2008	100
5.4	Asia and Latin America—Export Concentration Index—Intraregional Trade in Producer Goods—1992–2008	100
5.5	Asian Spoke Countries—Export Concentration Index—Producer Goods—1992–2008	101
5.6	Latin American Spoke Countries—Export Concentration Index— Producer Goods—1992–2008	101
5.7	Asia and Latin America—HHI Index for GDP in Constant Prices—1992–2008	102
5.8	East Asia and South Asia—Relative Entropy Indexes of GDP in Constant US Dollars—1992–2008	110
5.9	Central America, Andean Countries and MERCOSUR—Relative Entropy Indexes of GDP in Constant US Dollars—1992–2008	111
6.1	Latin America: Change in the Gini Coefficient, circa 2000–2009	116
6.2	Public Social Spending (in Per Capita US Dollars of 2000), 2000–2001 and 2008–2009	122
6.3	Public Spending in Health (in Per Capita US Dollars of 2000), 2000–2001 and 2008–2009	123
8.1	Regional Social Policies in Practice on Four Continents	153

Tables

1.1	Major Perspectives in the International Political Economy of Regionalism	18
4.1	Performance Indicators for East Asian Economies (GDP–Population)	66
4.2	Origins and Destinations of East Asian Intraregional Trade	68
4.3	East Asian Economies Development Indicators	72
4.4	Comparing East Asian Economies 1985–2010	76
4.5	Intra- and Extra-ASEAN Trade, 2009	82
5.1	Asia and Latin America. Trade in Producer Goods and Other Goods, 1992–2008	97
5.2	Asia and Latin America—Indicators of Convergence of GDP Growth Rates—1992–2008	103
5.3	Asia and Latin America—Correlation between Selected Pairs of Indicators	104
5.4	East and South Asia—Composition of Regional Trade in 1992–2008	105
5.5	East and South Asia—Composition of Regional and External Trade in 1992–2008	106
5.6	Latin America—Composition of Regional Trade in 1992–2008	107
5.7	Latin America—Composition of Regional and External Trade in 1992–2008	108
5.8	Relative Entropy Indexes of GDP, 1992–2008	109
5.9	Average (*) GDP Growth Rates (%), 1992–2008	111
6.1	Annual Average Rate of Growth of Real Average Earnings, 2003–2009	117
11.1	United States Military and Police Aid 2005–2010	200
11.2	US Military and Police Aid to the Region 2005–2010	201

List of Contributors

Renato Bauman is currently Director of the International Unit of IPEA (Brazilian Government think tank) and professor at the Universidade de Brasília and the Brazilian Diplomatic Academy. He holds a DPhil in Economics from Oxford University and was former Director (1995–2010) of the UN/ECLAC Brasília Office. He has written over 10 books and tens of articles regarding trade and integration in Latin America.

Francisco Carrión Mena is a specialist in international issues and diplomacy, and is ambassador at the Foreign Service of the Ecuadorian Government. He has been Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005–2007), Ambassador of Ecuador to Spain (2000–2005), and representative of Ecuador before the United Nations (2009–2011). He is author of various publications about migration, foreign policy, and international rights.

Carlos Espinosa is Director of Research and Professor of History at FLACSO–Ecuador. He holds a PhD in History from the University of Chicago and has been Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and Visiting Professor at Middlebury College. His research has encompassed Andean history, Latin American diplomatic history, and contemporary international security issues.

Juliana Martínez Franzoni is Associate Professor at the University of Costa Rica. Her work on social policy formation and socioeconomic and gender inequality in Latin America has been most recently rewarded with fellowships by Fulbright, the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, and the British Academy. She has published in journals like *Social Politics* (2012), *Development and Change* (2011), *Global Social Policy* (2011), and *Latin American Politics and Society* (2008). With Diego Sánchez-Ancochea she also has a forthcoming article in *Latin American Research Review*.

German Montenegro is PhD at the National University of Quilmes, Argentina, and researcher at the Department of Social Sciences there. He has occupied different positions in areas of security and defense in Argentina and South America such as Under Secretary of Military–Technical Issues, Secretary of Military Affairs at the Ministry of Defense, Government of Argentina, and currently is director of the School of National Defense.

Daniel Pontón has a Bachelor's Degree in Sociology and Master's Degree in Public Policy; is an Associated Researcher at FLACSO Ecuador; is Director of the Metropolitan Observatory of Citizen Security of Quito; and is studying for a PhD at the National University of Cuyo Argentina. He has a vast trajectory in the field research and consultant in themes of organized crime, crime, security policy, and citizen security. He has published different research papers in this regard and currently is advisor of the National Secretary of Planning and Development of the Ecuadorian Government.

Diego Sánchez-Ancochea is University Lecturer in the Political Economy of Latin America at the University of Oxford and Governing Body Fellow of St Antony's College. His research focuses on state–society relations, industrial policy, income distribution, and public policy. Recent publications include papers in *Latin American Research Review* (2013), *Studies in Comparative International Development* (2012), *Global Social Policy* (2011), and *Economy and Society* (2009). He has also coedited three books and (together with Juliana Martínez Franzoni) a special issue on varieties of capitalism in Latin America in *Economy and Society*.

Pía Riggiozzi holds a PhD from the University of Warwick and is lecturer in Global Politics at the Department of Social Sciences: Politics and International Relations. Her research focuses on global governance and international institutions, political economy of development, and regionalism. Some of her most distinguish works are *Post-neoliberalism in Latin America* (2012), *Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America* (2011), and *Social Policy in Post-neo-liberal Latin America*.

Freddy Rivera Vález is currently coordinator of the PhD program in International Studies at FLACSO Ecuador. He holds a PhD in sociology from the National University of Cuyo, Argentina. His research focuses on defense, intelligence, security, and organized crime for the Andean Region. He was undersecretary of state for the areas of domestic and citizen security.

Ernesto Vivares holds a PhD from the University of Sheffield and is research professor and coordinator of the program of International Relations at FLACSO Ecuador. His research focuses on the international political economy of development, South American regionalism, and research methods. Among his publications is *A Political Economy of Regional Development Banks: Financing Regional Growth and the Inter-American Development Bank. The Case of Argentina* (Routledge, 2013).

John Wong is currently Professorial Fellow and Academic Advisor at the East Asian Institute (EAI) of the National University of Singapore. He was formerly Research Director of EAI, and Director of the Institute of East Asian Political

Economy (IEAPE). Prior to these, he taught economics at the University of Singapore. He obtained his PhD from London in 1966. Has written and/or edited 34 books and published numerous articles and papers on China and other East Asian economies, including ASEAN.

Nicola Yeates is Professor of Social Policy at the Open University, UK. She has published widely on diverse matters of global and regional social policy from an international perspective, including most recently *World-Regional Social Policy and Global Governance: New Research and Policy Agendas in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America* (Routledge, 2010; co-edited with B. Deacon, M. Macovei, and L. van Langenhove). Full details of her research and publications can be located on Open University's Open Research Online (<http://oro.open.ac.uk>).

Preface

South America remains a strangely specialist taste for students of political economy in the uncertain world order of the present. Of late, the European Union has dominated attention because of the crisis of the Eurozone and the Union's full embrace of German-led austerity. The USA is of course never ignored and the world has watched as it has successively faced a key Presidential election, a fiscal cliff, and something that has come to be known as a sequester. East Asia too is now always a center of attention, with ongoing debates as to whether the economies of China and India are slowing and, if so, at what rate and with what implications for them and everybody else. As for the rest of the world, Africa has moved back into fashion, with some observers seeing signs of an economic renaissance. In all of this chatter, both academic and journalistic, South America often tends to be, if not ignored, then somewhat under-noticed.

It should not be; for, arguably, it has been in South America over the last decade or so that some of the most interesting and progressive experiments in the conduct of political economy have been taking place. Think of Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, to name only the most prominent of South American countries wherein novel strategies of economic, social, and political development are being explored in the aftermath of long decades of neo-liberalism. South America is actually a region of hope within the global political economy and it is highly likely that there are lessons that should be learnt from the experience of these countries, and others, in the region and then applied in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

In this situation it is excellent news that we now have available this new study edited by Ernesto Vivares. It is the product of a seminar held by FLACSO in Ecuador toward the end of 2011 and is most timely in its appearance. Vivares and his collaborators explore what they call the New South American Regionalism (NSAR). This formulation has been deliberately chosen to connect the intellectual endeavors of the FLACSO team to a prominent strand of academic literature of the last several years that has generally come to be known as the study of the "new regionalism." The starting-point here was the observation that the shift toward a more intense globalization from the early 1980s onwards was also accompanied by a widespread embrace (and in the case of the European Union perhaps a re-embrace) of regionalism. What had often been considered to be opposites in political economy (globalization versus regionalism, as it were) now appeared as complementary. Regionalism was seen variously as a means of resisting globalization, but also of managing it and possibly deepening it at the same time.

At any rate, there began to appear a volley of new accounts of contemporary regionalism in all parts of the world which were later assembled by analysts into

different schools of thought. Vivares describes the main contours of this literature very well in his chapter in this book and in fact identifies no less than six separable schools or approaches labeled, not necessarily all that clearly by their proponents: “neorealist,” “liberal institutionalist,” liberal economic integration,” “world order,” “new realist,” and “new regionalist.” This tide of writing has calmed a little of late, especially given that the core source for much of this thinking, namely Western Europe, has for some period of time seemed to be either stagnating or, more recently, fighting for its very regionalist existence. But the issues that gave rise to these debates have far from gone away and in any case, as implied above, South American regionalism remained under-studied by comparison with many other world regions.

Looking back into the new regionalist literature from a contemporary perspective, what appears to me to be most novel about it in retrospect was rather less what it had to say about how “new” regionalism was different to “old” regionalism, or indeed even what it had to say about regionalism as a form of regionalism. Its originality lay rather in the connection it made between regionalism and the much wider question of development, understood as the means by which countries (and regions) sought to insert themselves into the emerging global order on some basis that gave them opportunities to achieve at least a measure of well-being for some of their peoples. In other words, the focus on regionalism was a way of actually thinking about and addressing in a new era the longstanding, and entirely explicable, South American preoccupation with the core question of its development.

This book edited by Ernesto Vivares sits explicitly in this tradition of study. It seeks to analyze the new regional identity built up over the last few years in South America around the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). It takes for granted that this emerging reality does not easily fit into existing models of regionalism developed in other regions. We know in short what it is not, even if we cannot yet see sharply and clearly what it is. The problem here (but also the source of the interest of the phenomenon) is precisely that South American countries are in the process of “building a heterogeneous path of regional development within a changing hemispheric and world order.” I am quoting there from the book’s Introduction, because that summary remark captures neatly and accurately the topic at hand. The issue is not just about region-formation as a particular piece of political architecture, but instead, and centrally, about how people live, about well-being and inequality, about who wins and who loses in the politics of development. These are big questions, without doubt, but they are the ones that need effort and thought from all of us.

Vivares and his colleagues rightly do not attempt to assert a single answer to them. The book has been deliberately constructed on the basis of multiple disciplines and methods. The authors do not all agree, but they do talk interestingly to each other. There are chapters that focus on the making of markets and the pursuit of social policy, as well as others that consider different sorts of regional matters, such as drug trafficking, defense, and cooperation in the gathering of

intelligence. The diet offered is rich and varied. What holds it all together and what makes the book so palatable and so well worth reading is the conviction of all the contributors that something interesting and important is being constructed within the “New South American Regionalism.” I am convinced by this claim and I think you will be too when you have finished the book.

Anthony Payne
Director, of the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI)
University of Sheffield, UK

PART III
Broadening Regionalism: Crime,
Intelligence, and Defense

Chapter 11

Trends, Strategic Tensions, and Cooperation in Security and Intelligence in the Andean Region

Fredy Rivera Vélez

Introduction

Since the 1980s, Latin America has not had significant armed conflicts or wars between nations, with the exception of that between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. Aside from that incident, bilateral disagreements and border tensions have not led to open hostilities, which is the reason why—compared with other continents—Latin America is considered an area of peace between nations and with emerging signs of its new functioning organizations of integration such as the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR) that can replace the traditional Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, CAN) and, somewhat less so, the Common Market of the South (Mercado Comun del Sur, MERCOSUR). However, this situation, which indicates interstate tranquility, does not necessarily reflect the consolidation of a collective security regime, because tensions still persist and there are unresolved problems, such as those discussed here; for example, the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, or the permanent dispute and disagreement between Peru and Chile with regards to the maritime boundaries in the South Pacific. In fact, these four countries maintain judicial lawsuits in the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

The Andean region has not escaped from these tensions. While the last armed conflict was resolved in 1998 through peace talks and the establishment of definitive borders between Peru and Ecuador, the different interpretations of national security doctrines, internal security, or public security of the different countries, in addition to the incompatible political ideologies among the governments, represent factors that have repercussions in the new integration projects and accentuate the challenges to reaching their objective. One cannot disregard the complex, varied, and weak institutional development that paved the way for the attempts to establish integration mechanisms that can withstand the shifting politics of the region. Lastly, it is important to consider the interests and strategic political alignment of each one of the countries in relation to the

cooperation of the USA in intelligence, security, and defense that in many cases results in the construction of national agendas.

These limitations have not impeded the Andean countries from cooperating or trying to build bridges among themselves, as the region has signed several treaties that demonstrate the possibility that the states can harmonize their views regarding the struggle against drugs or ways to confront natural disasters; nevertheless, the majority of the agreements reached are bilateral in nature rather than having a multilateral character in which every country expresses its reservations or agreement.

We should keep in mind that in the past 15 years the Andean region has witnessed a displacement of strategic defense interests by internal security concerns dominated by prevailing drug-trafficking problems, all the while without abandoning recurrent plans for citizen safety. This last point—by means of ad-hoc conceptions, influences derived from health sciences and preestablished public policy formulas—has shown inefficiencies in combating organized international crime and its national connections;¹ thus some Andean governments have flirted with the intervention of armed forces for matters of internal security, although it implies undermining their doctrinaire nature, roles, and traditional notions.

In effect, the increase in transnational organized crime, especially that related to drug trafficking and its links to national crime, is reestablishing security agendas in Andean countries and promotes strong debates about the pertinence of existing intelligence to confront this phenomenon.

From that perspective, a series of questions arises that puts in doubt, on the one hand, the true significance and effectiveness of the old national security doctrines to combat the so-called new threats, and, on the other hand, questions whether sufficient forces exist for the cooperation in intelligence, because the declarations and discourses about the transnationality of organized crime is not sufficient to confront the reality due to the incremental impacts that this phenomenon has had on Andean countries.

This situation is complicated by the constitutional and normative changes that impact the inner workings of the military, police, and intelligence entities that are subject to democratic control on behalf of institutions that fulfill their obligation of defense, security, and intelligence activities.²

1 In principal, the indiscriminate use of epidemiological foci derived from the conceptual knowledge of public health to come up with technical answers to organized crime. These foci do not provide practical guarantees about the complex realities in the field of internal security that are so pressing in all the Andean countries. It is necessary to mention that the citizen security “packets” have broad support from multilaterals such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank.

2 The more representative case of controls, investigations, and sanctions is Colombia, where they have created dramatic modifications in the intelligence system, with legal reforms and restructuring in the Administrative Security Department (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, DAS), which is now called the Colombian Central Intelligence Agency (Agencia Central de Inteligencia de Colombia, ACI).

Tendencies in the Regional Strategic Environment

The Andean region presents a complex and contradictory scenario with different opportunities and challenges. All the Andean countries possess their own concerns and areas of interest, but a true shared security and intelligence agenda that satisfies the differences and interests of the actors still does not exist. While it is true that the states have demonstrated a disposition to have a dialogue and arrive at short-term agreements (some of which can be found in the UNASUR South American Defense Council), they fail to go any further and become concrete and binding medium-term policies. Instead, there exists a strong rhetoric about integration that could be considered in the plane of demagoguism and media politics.

An important element in the current moment for Andean security, defense, and intelligence is the varied reduction or increase in influence from the USA. This change is a result not only of the urgent and relevant concerns that Washington has in other regions of the world, but rather is related to the political and ideological changes produced in recent years in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, in addition to the increased importance of an emerging Brazil that has become involved in the security interests of these countries; in fact, except for Venezuela, the countries mentioned are not seen as authentic threats to national security for the USA. Traditionally close to Columbia and Peru—who replicate the North American security doctrine with certain nuances—the governments of G.W. Bush and Barack Obama have been relatively open spaces for a new style of regional autonomy in the areas of security and defense, but to a lesser degree for that of intelligence that still remains without significant reforms.

This does not mean lowering one's guard in terms of regional strategy because, after all, the USA reactivated the Fourth Fleet in 2009, they continue their costly and often criticized cooperation with Columbia in the antiguerrilla and terrorism struggle through the (not officially recognized) use of their military installations (WOLA, 2010: 5–6), and they still offer recurrent conditional help—except in Bolivia and Venezuela—for the war against drug trafficking that incorporates important intelligence cooperation through various programs and agreements with the different countries of the region (Tulchin, 2010: 5–6).

The tendency of the USA to have a cooperation that is more open to dialogue with some of the Andean countries includes the participation in the creation of new normative frameworks such as the Columbian Intelligence Law or the increase in support in military cooperation in the Peruvian war against drugs (US Embassy, 2011).³ That is not the case for countries seen as reticent to Washington policies,

3 Of the US\$65 million received by Peru as part of American cooperation in 2010, almost 50 percent was destined to the war against drugs, apart from the US\$27.8 million destined exclusively to military assistance.

such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, which to date have not reestablished diplomatic relations following the expulsion of Ambassador Heather Hodges.⁴

From this perspective, the role adopted by the USA stands out because, throughout the previous decades, the doctrine of national security was a focal point for implementing policies of defense in the region that operationally introduced the concept of “defense of internal security”. Currently, by opening thematic areas that include other security issues related to migration, terrorism, and organized crime, the notions of new threats create an opportune setting to refresh their presence and cooperation in the region.

When in 1989 the Andean Regional Initiative (IRA) was launched, the police and military presence increased significantly through assistance conditioned on the completion of objectives and programs aimed at combating drug trafficking that demanded military participation.⁵ The countries that adopted the war on drugs received economic and political compensation, such as the *Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)*,⁶ while those that resisted were made examples of with reductions, including commercial, military and police aid, as is currently happening with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

Table 11.1 US Military and Police Aid 2005–2010

Country	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Bolivia	45,156,590	41,306,546	37,293,624	27,844,589	22,639,640	22,765,690
Columbia	596,121,737	589,374,053	619,484,593	402,104,615	439,025,261	433,288,480
Ecuador	32,541,101	31,422,055	31,788,949	27,780,131	33,317,540	17,451,452
Peru	55,934,641	61,074,548	65,110,953	43,391,262	84,830,341	65,355,710
Venezuela	2,279,450	552,550	1,557,500	617,463	636,660	421,660

Source: Just the Facts http://justf.org/All_Grants_Country?year1=1996&year2=2012

Faced with these dynamics, the possibility of influencing the conformation of multilateral groups and their politics in a better way has not gone unnoticed for the Andean States and their leaders. One of the most noticeable actors, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, has been precisely the figure that tried to position himself as a relevant actor through his critiques of the USA; questioning the legitimacy

4 Ecuador deported the American Ambassador and declared her a “persona non grata” as a result of a confidential diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks, and published by the newspaper *El País*, about supposed police corruption in Ecuador. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ecuador/expulsa/embajadora/EE/UU/cable/Wikileaks/elpepuint/20110405elpepuint_17/Tes.

5 The inclusion of drug trafficking as a national security threat can be seen in all the countries of the region. Since 2000, White Defense Books have been created that describe this situation.

6 Unilateral program for the promotion of development of exports and commerce.

of the Organization of the American States (OAS; Organización de los Estados Americanos, OEA), especially for its management of the crisis surrounding the Honduran coup d'état in 2009, during which the USA played a lukewarm role as the protagonist in defense of democracy; and, he has found political allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Nicaragua, and some Caribbean States.

The rejection of Chávez by the USA led to the formation of alliances and strategic relationships with Russia and China, whose interests have traditionally been distant from Andean affairs and matters of defense. China in particular has been able to link itself strongly with the countries of the region through economic and commercial relationships, leaving the door open for possible stronger ties in the areas of security and defense. In recent years, Venezuela has increased its military spending considerably—to US\$3.106 billion in 2010—justifying it as a response to the possibility of an armed invasion by the USA or Columbia, which spent \$9.191 billion for the same year (Sipri, 2010).

Along with Cuba, Chávez has tried to establish himself as an alternative to the old ties to the USA, although the real power of Venezuela is limited and his discourse is not well received in many sectors of the regions (Ildis, 2007: 27); however, he already has allies in the Andean region, one of whom, Bolivian president Evo Morales, dissolved his country's cooperation with the USA in the areas of defense, intelligence, and internal security (especially in the area of drug trafficking), and bilateral relations between the two countries have not been reestablished since 2008. Another of the countries close to Venezuela is Ecuador, whose relationship with the USA has also deteriorated, although to a lesser degree than Bolivia's, and whose rhetoric is less hostile than Venezuela's. The recent election of Ollanta Humala in Peru would seem to also align that country with the leftist tendency of the Andean region, although it is too early to make predictions one way or the other. The political ties between the countries could be the first step that allows for the formulation of common security and regional defense policies.

On the other side of the spectrum we find Columbia, whose cooperation with the USA continues to be one of the fundamental pillars in its struggle against illegal armed groups such as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the ELN, and paramilitaries, as well as its efforts to combat groups of drug traffickers.

Table 11.2 US military and police aid to the region, 2005–2010 (US\$ m. = million US dollars)

País	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Bolivia	274	277	307	361	347	314
Colombia	6,541	6,909	7,431	8,323	8,569	9,191
Ecuador	1,146	1,108	1,493	1,628	1,915	2,116
Perú	1,434	1,476	1,416	1,387	1,712	1,992
Venezuela	4,558	6,014	5,021	5,562	4,273	3,106
Venezuela	4,558	6,014	5,021	5,562	4,273	3,106

Source: Sipri, 2010

Cooperation between Columbia and the United States is the subject of constant criticism from Venezuela, who considers the USA as using its relationship and ties with Columbia to maintain its influence in the Andean region and in the south of the continent. Nevertheless, the new government of Juan Manuel Santos has managed to establish more solid relationships with its neighbors, leaving in the past the ruptures that have occurred during the administration of his predecessor, Álvaro Uribe Vélez. In this sense, he has cleared the way for potentially closer cooperation between the member countries of the region (El Carabobeño, 2011).⁷

Despite the improvement in bilateral relations initiated by Santos, Plan Columbia continues to be a tense and delicate subject in the regional affairs, with the existence of disparate views regarding its implications for Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In effect, the development of Plan Columbia, along with its successes and failures, is directly related to the shifts of the security and defense policies taken up by the authorities of the neighboring countries, because the spaces of intervention of armed groups and Colombian criminal bands have expanded. This is a consequence of the “spillover” of intervention and infiltration operations into institutions by obtaining new areas of operation in ports and frontier zones that are vulnerable due to their remoteness, lack of attention by the public policies, or lack of coordination of control and monitoring.

The desires of the governments to set into motion their own defense, security, and intelligence initiatives are one fundamental piece that has a double edge. On the one hand, it confronts its own necessities as a function of the threats to neutralize; but on the other hand, these same agreements and promises can generate an imbalance of regional forces because the states are not necessarily inclined toward those options (Rojas, 2007: 15).

Venezuela, for example, for all its focus on the UNASUR, prefers to also develop efforts to politically position the Bolivian Alliance for America (Alianza Bolivariana para América, ALBA), which finds counterweights to initiatives such as the Pacific Accord, recently signed between Columbia, Peru, Mexico, and Chile. Both aspire to influence in the area of security and neither is purely Andean. The tendency of the Andean countries to get on board with different cooperation initiatives supersedes the traditional sphere of the community and aims for more appealing spaces and initiatives with possibilities in the subcontinent such as UNASUR.

The Political Economy of Organized Crime, Institutions, and the Use of Rationalities

Organized crime and drug trafficking generated in Columbia and Peru pass through Ecuador and Venezuela principally on their way to Mexico to then connect to the

⁷ An example of this change in the Colombian external politics is found in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Ecuador that were broken off due to the bombing in March 2008, and the rapprochement with president Chávez that settled tensions regarding the subject of the Venezuelan tolerance of the FARC. .

USA or Europe via the west coast of Africa. Recently, Brazil has converted into a destination of the criminal operations due to its condition as an emerging power and the increase in internal demand for drugs, socioeconomic spaces to launder assets, and arms trafficking. In this incremental context, both legal and illegal businesses find fertile ground in a territory that operates with an elevated dose of informality in the economy and institutional controls. Also, let us remember that the drug dealer has the capacity to corrupt public officials, police, military personnel, border guards and customs agents, judges and public prosecutors, private businessmen, supervisors, and so on, which makes the crime more dynamic in the face of the pronounced debilitation of the state's ability to deal with them.

Transnational and local organized crime operates in the "gaps" not filled by the formal, modern economy with public and private institutional supervision. It employs financial agents where the markets permit great quantities of money to circulate without passing through controlled transactions; it utilizes the opportunities made possible by the imbalance in the market of land, work, and commerce; in general it takes advantage of the informal dynamics of the economy, the lack of employment, and it is harbored in NGOs and organisms such as churches and philanthropic entities.

In addition to that, the deficits in the management of the controls in institutions, the infiltration of supervisory entities, and the weakened legislation in the anti-asset laundering field tend to construct a panorama of vulnerability in the face of the intervention operations of organized crime. Recent investigations that use an interdisciplinary methodology and also redirect the object of the study toward the criminal activities before the criminal organizations have realized the diverse strategies of the actors in the same activity; that is to say, the "model" criminal explanation, looks at the environments and opportunities, the activities of the drug dealer, gas smuggling, and human trafficking as a function of the windows of opportunities, risks, and damages.

The role of the organizations, independent of their nature or functional structure, will be as rational agents that take advantage of these opportunities and convert them into ways to achieve high economic returns by committing illegal acts. The new focus also look at the level of criminal infiltration in institutional, state, and private spheres to demonstrate the level of social impact or damage, as it does not seek to uncritically repeat methodologically obsolete approaches, based on epidemiological analyses of citizen security that have been legitimized in recent years and have become models or "formulas" for the design of public policies but that do not explain the real dynamics and unfolding of organized crime (Nuñez, 2011; Pontón and Rivera, 2011).⁸

8 Critical analyses warn about the conceptual and methodological limitations of the use of notions derived from citizen security to understand the politic economy of organized crime, its causes, motivations, and the sphere of intervention. What's curious about the case is that the design of several public policies and certain sectors of the academy continue using slogans as discursive media filler that legitimizes its role in the public opinion despite its demonstrated ineffectiveness.

Drug dealing is one of the transversal subjects of interest for the entire region because it presents an enveloping effect through the increase in violence and insecurity in all the countries where its operations of action and penetration are under way. This threat, however, does not affect the state security understood as the possibility of conquest or the dismantling of the state or its territory, but rather expresses a more complex and interdependent problem due to the shared intersection of phenomena such as elevated indices of social and political violence, organized delinquency, illegal arms trafficking, among others, that negatively affect the population.

In this sense, the concerns of the states regarding the well-being of their habitants and territories are also expressed in the promulgation of new laws and regulations regarding security, defense, and intelligence. These legal bodies consist of important components directed at the distinct fields of security and defense that incorporate various dimensions and structures.

The Policies of Security and Intelligence Versus Organized Crime

For decades, the doctrine of national security was implemented in various South American countries like a reference guide on how to construct security, defense, and intelligence policies. In Ecuador and Bolivia, these doctrines have been revised and they have established new laws that seek to supersede the traditional laws. Columbia and Peru persist in continuing with the norms that give them results in the combat against internal and external threats, despite having initiated interesting reforms in the intelligence sector; nevertheless, the position of organized crime as an objective is not consistent and varies according to the particularity of each country and the moment in which they find themselves aligned with the respective intelligence community.

In effect, the discussion about intelligence communities, their operating environment, their sectorial application and, above all, the influence of and relationship with the intelligence police, continue to be topics rarely raised in the academic and public policy analyses, because the weight of the military sector in the intelligence systems of Andean countries persists and hinders the development of a strategic intelligence under civil democratic conduct (Rivera, 2011). This represents a limitation to confront the contingencies from the operations spread by the actions of criminal bands that have regional and extraregional connections. Without wanting to, it also favors the growth of specialized and professional criminal activity, that—from the view of intelligence—the institutional, doctrinaire, and regulatory changes in our countries are slow compared with the needs of a certain intelligence community. It is not strange then, that US national security views with apprehension the increasing closeness of Bolivia and Ecuador to the Venezuelan and Bolivarian communities that have opened important channels with China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran; in fact, these ups and downs with the traditional and hegemonic source of US cooperation have opened new intervention scenarios

in light of reforms. While this happens in the rational game of trial and error, it increases the vulnerabilities of each one of the Andean countries that is connected interdependently by organized crime.

It is not enough in current times to define organized crime with the slogan or phrase “new threats” to distance it from the old perceptions of national security associated with realism, and try to combat it all at the same time. The complex and dynamic sector of economic rationality that unfolds and the capacity of infiltration that the international organized crime agencies have in the social fabric of our countries is not being addressed in an adequate manner by the national intelligence agencies. Greater dynamism is seen with regards to preparation, the use of the latest operations and communication technology, the analysis of strategic zones, as well as national and international markets that the criminal actors use, all related to preventive and neutralizing responses by intelligence systems of our countries. In this sense, the national discourses are anchored in nineteenth-century sovereignty and the application of failed security prescriptions in other regional contexts. Organized crime demonstrated its rationalities a long time ago by anticipating the changes that have existed in the countries of the Andean region.

Seen from this regional perspective, Andean intelligence is faced with distinct particularities, heterogeneities, and problems, the concerted efforts of national and international criminal bands that take advantage of, or operate under, the combination of various factors:

- The strategic geographic position of certain zones of the region that link with international crime activity, especially border areas as well as maritime and river ports.
- The economic rationality created by the differentiated insertion in globalization that modifies spaces, productive agents, and subregional commercial spheres that energized in their own ways the incontrollable circuits of financial informality and monetary circulation outside the formal, modern, and institutionalized organisms in the public and private spheres. In the Ecuadorian case, the existence of the dollarization and, in the case of Venezuela, the distinct bands for the type of exchange that produced black markets, constitute elements that facilitate money laundering. Peru is not far behind with its tolerance of casinos and game parlors, where millions of dollars and other currencies circulate.
- The gradual deinstitutionalization of justice entities, financial and police controls that have opened “breaches” or spaces for the infiltration of mafia operations through corrupt purchases, intimidation or threats in order to not do or “stop doing” through the omission of controls, which generally designate by action or omission.
- The interdependence that exists between the countries of the regions and the 50-plus-year unresolved internal conflict in Columbia that has involved neighboring territories through the use of armed state and non-state actors,

and the derivations and negative impact of Plan Columbia throughout these many years.

- The doctrinaire modifications in the national police and armed forces, and the constitutional changes that opened different public policy scenarios in security, defense, and intelligence sending the countries of the region on two paths: Peru and Columbia on one path, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela on the other. These modifications have created possibilities for a greater infiltration of organized crime in the state structures and the societies in general.
- The ups and downs, fluctuations, ruptures, and continuities of the external politics of each of the Andean countries in relation to the bilateral security and/or antidrug programs established with the USA. At this point, it is crucial to analyze the topic of cooperation, the system of controls of the receiving government, and the debates around the sovereignty of the “intelligence” of Ecuador and Bolivia is radically different from that of Peru and Columbia.

In general terms, the combined interaction of these six factors support a complex set of problems that centers on the operations and branching out of organized crime that links various dimensions, facets, spaces, actors, and interdependent dynamics between neighboring countries but that are articulated to territories as distant as Mexico, Brazil, and the European Union (Pontón and Rivera, 2011).

Conceptual Limitations and Practical Relations

The absence of a unifying perspective at the regional level is not the only challenge for the distinct initiatives from the Andean countries; there is also the conduct and particular concerns of each government that affects the practice and solidifying of regional relations. In this sense, the progress toward the real integration continues to be limited despite the desire to establish normative frameworks and conventions with relative ease.

One of the greatest challenges to overcome is the divergent security interests between the diverse states, because, if common areas exist that should be addressed in a joint manner such as international organized crime or drug trafficking, there are other tensions that debilitate a potential regional unity. This includes the new tendency of US cooperation to be expressed more in bilateral than multilateral terms.

The permeability of the borders has meant, for example, that Ecuador and Venezuela consider the Colombian conflict to be one of the most relevant matters in terms of national security and defense. This is because irregular combatants, state security forces, and Colombian intelligence entities carry out, openly or clandestinely, operations of a distinct nature in sovereign territories of neighboring countries. In this context, the actions of the FARC in Venezuela and Ecuador

have found a decisive although questionable reply on behalf of the government of Columbia, exemplified by the fumigation of coca crops and the execution of Operation Phoenix in 2008, which violated the territorial sovereignty by bombarding a drug insurgent camp within the Ecuadorian national space.

These types of operations were condemned by Latin American countries and led to an increased mobilization of the armed forces in the borders of Venezuela and Ecuador, at the same time that they created tensions and diplomatic ruptures with various consequences. If this case in particular can be considered closed since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Columbia in 2010, the underlying problem remains dormant and demonstrates the inability of the states to generate coordinated—much less joint—responses to an important security problem on their borders. There are divergent views about who should confront the problem, how to go about it, and which mechanisms to use to create compromises and agreements on this topic, as well as which hierarchal structures are transparent and overcome the dialogue among the deaf among the countries; so, whichever way you look at it, one of the challenges to be addressed is to establish a zone of integration and peace such as that mentioned in the declaration of principle of UNASUR.

The region's border issues continue to be particularly delicate beyond the problems between Columbia and its neighbors. Currently, Peru and Chile still have a dispute regarding their maritime borders, and Bolivia persists with its historic demand for access to the sea that was lost to Chile during the Pacific War in the late nineteenth century; in effect these tensions hinder interstate relations between the concerned parties. Chile and Peru continue to wait for a resolution to their dispute in the tribunal of The Hague while maintaining a certain degree of military tension in the disputed zone; meanwhile, Chile refuses to address the Bolivian subject with any depth until the dispute with Peru is resolved.

With regard to the Bolivian complaint, the Chilean authorities have do not come up with options beyond the possibility of offering facilities to Bolivia to have nonsovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, an offer which is insufficient for the Bolivian government. While both Chile and Peru have promised to honor the verdict of tribunal, whatever that may be, their border relations will continue to be tense for the immediate future, and one cannot envision a resolution to the dispute in the near future.

Apart from its border issues, Peru has other concerns of an internal nature that are also related to problems in Columbia and the region. More than three years ago, operative cells of the Shining Path guerilla group began to reappear after a period of relative calm in several areas of the Peruvian sierra and the Amazon that are associated with coca growth and the production of cocaine; evidence of a connection with the regional drug traffic and international organized crime which lends it distinct characteristics to those activities seen in the 1980s and 1990s.

These new realities and situations, which bring with them new security and intelligence concerns, also present better opportunities to coordinate forces between

the different states, not only in the Andean region but in the entire subcontinent. If indeed the threats of organized crime and drug trafficking are difficult to deal with and confront through state mechanisms, especially the military, they are recognized by all the states as a more-or-less homogeneous way of addressing common problems that allow for the possibility of interstate cooperation in the future in police and intelligence operations.

From this perspective, the countries of the Andean region have successfully promoted bilateral agreements among themselves with the goal of facilitating cooperation in the struggle against drug trafficking. Independently of their tensions and political visions, Columbia has reached cooperation agreements with Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela, and there is a general tendency in the region to celebrate those types of conventions. In the multilateral environment, all the Andean states have adhered to the statute regarding the fight against drug trafficking signed in the framework of the UNASUR in mid-2010, an instrument that forms part of the central themes of the agenda of the South American Council on the World Drug Problem established the same year.

In areas related to peace, national defense, and military armament, the prospects are less encouraging for the Andean region, as in the last few years there has been a considerable increase in military spending and a propensity toward an arms race despite the existence of conventions and appeals to slow arms acquisitions, principally in the framework of the OAS and the UNASUR (Rivera, 2010).

The logic behind this increase corresponds as much to the legitimate right to the modernization of antiquated military equipment as to the security dilemmas that have been overcome in the continent (WOLA, 2010: 13). This situation then presents a challenge for the current and future measures of mutual trust, transparency, and other international instruments that seek to convert the region into a zone of peace and stability.

Challenges to Cooperation and National Realities

The particular conditions of internal security and defense that intersect all the Andean countries constitute an important challenge in and of itself that must be addressed. As mentioned, the strategic character of the region obliges the design of novel formulas to confront the set of new challenges and cooperation in terms of intelligence assumed as an empirical necessity; nevertheless, the CAN, weakened by the unilateralism of its four remaining members, would find it difficult to represent itself in a forum capable of constructing a common strategic Andean agenda, despite the fact that it does participate in the security regimes such as the Inter-American Defense Board (Junta Inter-Americana de Defensa, JID) and the South American Defense Council (Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano, CDS) (Leal, 2007: 3–4). This last group has already overcome one of its first difficulties by successfully incorporating Columbia in its framework despite the reservations and many of the other member states.

In fact, Columbia managed to reinforce its image as a committed state with the initiative of UNASUR to negotiate, along with Venezuela, the securing of the position of the secretary general of the organization after the death of the late secretary Néstor Kirchner. The certainty that this secretariat will be alternated with Venezuela is another positive sign of openness, as it indicates that both countries are capable of working together despite the political differences of their leaders (Vargas, 2011).

Beyond the conventional types of political discussions, the treatment of issues such as the struggle against drug trafficking in the framework of the UNASUR is positive; although there has existed a lot of rhetoric and little concreteness until now, because from its beginning there was a debate about the scope of the Council to go beyond matters of security, clearly established in the Bariloche Mandate of 2008, to include areas such as public health, justice, education, and development. If these areas were related to the subject of drugs, this would distort the character that the Council was originally founded upon. The issue, seen as a uniting priority in the government agendas, has the potential of converting itself into a relevant space for the formulation of the common policies in the future.

The additional space in which it is possible to make advances, and in which there already exists a normative framework, is the transparency of defense administration and spending, potentially with a view to limiting or even reversing the current tendency toward growth. While it is too early to talk about an arms race in Latin America, the possibility of one happening has not disappeared entirely. The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA; Comisión Económica para América Latina, CEPAL, in Spanish) and the OAS have designed mechanisms to be able to make these processes transparent, which could be adapted and improved for cases such as the UNASUR in search of better results than those which have been currently achieved. A higher degree of transparency in defense matters would considerably strengthen the measure of mutual confidence and could lead to instances of more effective cooperation through sharing knowledge about the strengths, possibilities, and limitations of the states.

It is important to note the relevance of the UNASUR and the CDS as spaces of integration. This is due to the initiative in particular that has been able to include difference actors of the region independent of their political perspectives, something that the CAN and ALBA have do not achieved, thereby generating at the same time the space and the opportunities for Brazil to attempt to consolidate its role as a regional power and an alternative to the USA. As opposed to the OAS, which has been the target of criticism from some states, the UNASUR and CDS have been conceived to function without the presence of the USA.

As a space of future cooperation the CDS offers some noticeable advantages. First of all, the organization already has the membership of almost all the South American countries, independently of their political posture, and it offers the possibility for all the members to influence its agenda. At least in its normative aspect, the CDS already integrates military and nonmilitary mechanisms, continues the achievements made possible with the CAN and MERCOSUR in defense and

security, and aligns itself with the framework previously established by the UN and the OAS (Menezes Teixeira, 2010: 51). While the organism is too new to evaluate its performance, it has very real possibilities of having an strategic importance in the future, not only in the formulation of common policies at the negotiating table, but also a possibility of establishing mechanisms that permit the completion of field operations. This last point depends a great deal on a continuous process of institutionalization and strengthening. Without this process, the CDS will remain just a forum for discussion or a place for the formulation of agreements, without really going beyond the other previous initiatives as has happened in previous years.

For its part, the Andean region would find it difficult to present itself as a space for integration and cooperation beyond the network of bilateral initiatives mentioned previously. The already established CAN has had little real success in its attempts to influence security matters, and the political divisions between the member states have more importance in this space than in others. Also, considering the exit of Chile and Venezuela from the organization, even successful initiatives within this framework would have a limited reach with only four countries. While it is possible that third-party alternatives to the OAS and the new UNASUR could reach the Andean region, the differences in policies between the states and their postures around the CAN make this a rather remote possibility, as there is no guarantee that a new Andean project would triumph in the face of a lack of willingness to start new binding initiatives.

Conclusions

The Andean region has little possibility of consolidating a situation of cooperation on its own. This should negate the possibility of constructing a viable space for the promotion of peace and security through two mechanisms. The first is the opportunity brought through permanent efforts and the willingness to create bilateral ties through the collaboration in areas such as fighting drug trafficking and organized crime which include important intentions of creating links between judicial systems. Secondly, in the multilateral plan, there is clearly an active participation of the Andean countries in extraregional initiatives such as the UNASUR; in this sense, it can be said that the Andean perspectives of establishing itself as an area of cooperation and security depend on the success of the South American initiatives more than on the Andean-only institutions that already exist.

As is the case in all of South America, the Andean region will have to continue pushing for clear and reliable mechanisms of dialogue and transparency in order to reduce tensions and eliminate barriers that impede the greater cooperation. The inclusion of preexisting frameworks in the UNASUR could be a good alternative to reach this objective, to create a system that articulates the achievements of the OAS and JID, as well as the multiple bilateral conventions and measures of mutual confidence that already exist to orient the practices and norms, bilateral as well as multilateral, in the future.

The elimination of the security dilemmas that the states generate mutually would have another important positive aspect if it allowed for greater cooperation on other important problems at the regional level: the disparity and heterogeneity of the intelligence services and their appointment to different communities, which hinders the increase of a fundamental resource to reach this objective: confidence.

Despite the multiplicity of bilateral initiatives, many of them managed at informal levels, there still does not exist a functional regional group that can effectively confront this problem. In a multilateral environment, UNASUR has made some progress in this sense, but a more effective cooperation is necessary to deal with these interstate and domestic problems.

At the same time, it would be convenient for the states to continue promoting and strengthening initiatives that have already been handled with success in the past. Activities such as the humanitarian demining between Peru and Ecuador demonstrate the possibility of generating real tangible cooperation between countries, a possibility that would be worth exploring further and advancing, and potentially expanding to other areas. Latin America is not an example for the world in terms of cooperation in security and defense, but there are few reasons that it could do not be in the future, and many of them lie in the political sphere.

While it is possible to conceive of Latin America and the Andean region in particular as zones of peace due the absence of interstate conflict, the existence of some unresolved tensions and the continuation of traditional practices linked to doctrines of national security appear to be limiting factors for cooperation in the near future. This is an obstacle that can be overcome but just because of that it should not be underestimated. Without an efficient treatment that deals with the inclusion of shared strategic intelligence, the possibility for the Andean countries to deal with their disputes and their internal problems will remain stuck.

It is important to mention the importance of the series of legal, normative, structural, and police and military doctrine reforms that are underway in the Andean countries. This situation will open new areas for cooperation, but also will constitute a challenge to be overcome due to the enormous complexity that the exterior politics, the national interests, and the strategies of each of the governments represent.