Seguridad multidimensional en América Latina

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Seguridad multidimensional
en América Latina

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Towards a new understanding of civil-military relations

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Introduction

There are many open questions regarding virtually all aspects of contemporary security, especially the activities states engage in and the instruments they use to achieve domestic and international security. While many still consider "providing for the nation's defense" to be the main purpose for the armed forces, for example, few militaries today are in fact trained and equipped to engage in combat with militaries of other states. Instead, militaries are involved in a wide variety of other activities. Today there are some 81,000 military and police personnel from up to 114 countries engaged in peace support operations (PSO) in sixteen strife-ridden countries. According to the United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, by the end of 2007 the UN will have over 140,000 peacekeepers deployed. In early 2007, international peacekeeping forces in Haiti were engaged in fighting street gangs, which is more typically a police function (New York Times, 2007: 1).

In many regions, military forces either support or, in the case of Mexico in early 2007, even supplant police forces in operations to con-

trol organized and street crime, to the dismay of advocacy groups who demand that police and military functions be separate.[1] On the other side of the coin, in countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, the Philippines and Pakistan, the police fulfill military functions. In our contemporary era, where threats span the spectrum from global terrorism, to national and international drug cartels, to street gangs that operate internationally[2] militaries and police forces rely heavily on effective intelligence organizations to help plan their missions.

There is, in short, a conglomeration of activities that incorporate the different instruments of state security to deal with contemporary opportunities, challenges and threats in national and international environments. This scrambling of activities, and the resulting ambiguity of jurisdiction and chain of command, are the hard facts that policy makers must deal with to meet domestic and, increasingly, international responsibilities. Furthermore, they must be able to justify their choices to domestic and international constituencies who, for example, want respectively increased commitments and competence for both internal policing and external PSO forces.

Unfortunately, the extant conceptual literature that should assist policy makers and scholars to fully understand the instruments states may use for these various security activities is either outdated or singular in focus –that is, they discuss military, police, or intelligence issues as unique from each other. This narrow view becomes problematic even when dealing with the literature's putative primary focus of analysis, civilian control of the armed forces. For example, the literature on civil-military relations

(CMR) concentrates on civilian control of the armed forces, even where this control is not in question. This lack of perspective leaves a significant gap in our comprehension of the relationship between civilians and the armed forces, because there is no analysis of the roles and missions the broader security sector must perform, the levels of knowledge civilians must gain in order to control that sector, and the lack of understanding that actually exists in the interactive relationship between security forces and the elected officials who govern them. Even when civilian control is unquestioned, as in the United States, control by itself is no guarantee that civilian policy makers will make good decisions, or implement policy in such a way as to result in military, police or intelligence success. Witness the war in Iraq as a contemporary example of misguided civilian policy in which senior officers buckled under the Secretary of Defense.[3] In short, control, despite the overwhelming focus in the literature, by itself does not provide a sufficient understanding of contemporary issues in civil-military relations. The conceptual literature on other security instruments, such as the police and intelligence community, is sketchy, and that dealing with major activities such as PSO and counterterrorism is even less developed. The majority of studies that do exist are all about tradecraft, intelligence failures, policy positions, or some contemporary case study on how the police and citizens in depressed area banded together to reduce crime and clean up the neighborhood.[4]

Security sector reform (SSR) has been proffered in Great Britain and parts of Europe, explicitly or implicitly, as an alternative or even replacement for CMR. While SSR lends some clarity to contemporary issues by broadening both the definition of threats and the range of instruments a state uses to combat them, there is no agreement on what SSR as a concept means, and there are as many confusing arguments as there are convincing ones as to why SSR has something to recommend it over CMR. Our goal in this article is to begin to conceptualize the main activities

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1   In "Blurring the Lines: Trends in U.S. Military Programs with Latin America," the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) bemoans the military doing missions that the police are expected to conduct in established democracies. "[H]aving the military carry out crime fighting or other roles that civilians can fill – risks politicizing the armed forces, which in turn leads the military to use (or threaten to use) its monopoly of arms whenever it disagrees with the civilian consensus." WOLA, September 2004, 1; available at: http://www.wola.org/security/blurringthelinesfinal.pdf. Meanwhile, on January 3, 2007, President Felipe Calderón of Mexico sent 3,300 army troops to Tijuana to fight against crime and drug trafficking. Furthermore, according to the *Economist*, 10,000 soldiers in Mexico have been transferred to the Federal Agency of Investigation, which is similar to the U.S. FBI. *Economist,* January 27, 2007, 33.
2   For a discussion of gang evolution, see John P. Sullivan (1997: 95-108) and, John P. Sullivan (2000: 82-96).

3   See, for example, Thomas Ricks (2006), for just one of many authoritative accounts of the poor planning and implementation of U.S. security in Iraq.
4   Some of the few exceptions include Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (2005); Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (2007); John Bailey and Lucia Dammert (2005); and Hugo Frühling and Joseph S. Tulchin with Heather Golding (2003).

nations engage in to achieve security, and, to continue to build on the recent progress that a few theorists have made within the context of CMR and SSR.

We do not think the narrow approach of most civil-military relations literature focusing on the instruments and their control is the most productive, and will instead look first at the activities the security sector, comprising military, police and intelligence personnel, participate in – their roles and missions. We will develop this analysis through several stages. First, we will review the most relevant conceptual literature that deals with security and the instruments nations use to achieve it; these will be CMR and SSR. Second, we will describe the "trinity" of major concepts –democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency– embodied in our approach to CMR and, with at least one author, SSR, so that they can be understood and applied in the context of roles and missions carried out by security forces. Third, we will discuss these concepts as they apply to the analysis of security forces and their roles and missions. Finally, we will elaborate on a few of the tradeoffs states are likely to incur as they attempt to balance democratic control, effectiveness and efficiency. Fifteen years' experience conducting programs on civil-military relations throughout the world has shown us the utility of these three parameters, and interestingly enough, we find them highlighted in some key documents dealing with policy.[5] Sadly, theory, the conceptual literature on security policy and civil – military relations, is far behind reality and even, in some cases, policy.

Civil-Military Relations in Historical Perspective

The classic literature on CMR, now dating back fifty years, is closely associated with the books of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Amazingly enough, this literature still largely defines the field today. These authors focused on the more established democracies, especially the United States, and were mainly concerned with the issue of reconciling a military strong enough to do what civilian leaders want it to do, with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize it to do (Feaver, 1996: 149-177). Or, as Dale Herspring has recently written, "As I surveyed the literature on civil-military relations in the United States, I was struck by the constant emphasis on 'control'" (Herspring, 2005).

This conceptualization, dominated exclusively by U.S. authors, assumes a democratic political context, and is overwhelmingly associated with the Cold War military stand-off between the "West" and the "East." There are two main foci in this literature. First is fear of the threat a large standing army poses to a democracy and the need to keep it subordinate –that is, under civilian control.[6] Second are the implications of a trade-off between security and liberty. The work of the most prolific current analyst and critic of this idea, Peter D. Feaver, would seem to fit well within these two parameters (Feaver, 2003). His most prominent books all assume a relatively well-established and unquestioned democratic context, and then examine the CMR issues that arise and the institutions these democracies employ to manage relations between the civilian government and the armed forces. For these reasons, while the amount of attention given to the "crisis in U.S. civil-military relations" during the presidency of William J. Clinton might make sense in the U.S. domestic political context, it is irrelevant for analytical purposes in most other parts of the world.[7] Nor is Huntington's formulation, linked as it is to the U.S. democratic experience, of much use in other parts of the world where democracy is new and still tentative, and institutions are anything but hallowed and unquestioned.

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5   For a definitive policy statement, see NATO (2004); available from the NATO On-line Library of Basic Texts: http//www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm#II-D.

6   For insights into the thoughts of the framers of the U.S. Constitution, see for example, Richard H. Kohn in Richard H. Kohn, ed. (1991: 61- 94).

7   On the U.S. "crisis," see Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn (2001).

Civil-Military Relations in the Context of Democratization

Since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization, which started on 25 April 1974 in Lisbon, with the military coup that became a revolution and gradually evolved into democracy, the nature of civil-military issues shifted (Huntington, 1991) Even though neither Portugal nor Spain, whose transition began upon the death of Francisco Franco in late 1975, were military dictatorships, their militaries played key parts in the transitions to democracy (Bruneau, 1986; Aguero, 1995). This was even more the case as the Third Wave spread to include explicitly military regimes in Latin America, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Even the transitional governments of the former Marxist-dominated Soviet bloc, while never under military rule, had to come to terms with their armed forces once the Berlin Wall came down. In Romania, for example, the army was a central actor in the transition to democracy from the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu and his nefarious Securitate (secret police). Therefore, many analyses of democratic transitions and consolidation since 1974 include, of necessity, a discussion of CMR. The major contribution by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan on Southern Europe, South America and post-Communist Europe includes different military groups, or CMR, as a central variable under the category of actors. (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Highly regarded analysts of transitions and consolidation, such as Adam Przeworski and Philippe Schmitter, call explicit attention to the "military variable" of CMR (Przeworski, 1991; Schmitter, 1995). There also are some excellent case studies of CMR in the context of transitions and consolidation, or, in the case of Venezuela, deconsolidation (Cottey, Edmunds, Forster, 2002; Pion-Berlin, 1997; Stepan, 1998; Trinkunas, 2006).

These works all evaluate the role of the military, including in some cases the police and intelligence agencies, in democratic consolidation. Most of these authors also take into account the institutions whereby CMR is implemented, some of which carry out oversight functions. What these works demonstrate is that, in contrast to their authoritarian pasts, whether military- or civilian-dominated, the emerging democracies of South America, post-communist Europe, South Africa and elsewhere emphasize democratic security over national security. In other words, these new regimes focus on how to control the armed forces, which in many cases were themselves previously in control of –or even constituted– the government. Again, the focus is on control, its achievement and exercise by civilians over the military, and never on what the militaries or other instruments of security are able to do in terms of roles and missions.

Civil-Military Relations in the Early 21ˢᵗ Century

We have found from our experience during the past fifteen years with CCMR in working directly with civilians and officers in consolidating democracies, that the narrow analytical focus on civilian control, as described in the two approaches above, is not adequate either empirically or, for the purpose of developing comparisons, conceptually. Unfortunately, at the end of the Cold War, not only governments themselves, but also leading international organizations such as the prolific Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, remained overwhelmingly focused on issues of control, to the neglect of what the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies are actually expected to accomplish.[8] Despite this monochrome focus in the literature, in reality militaries have long been directed toward humanitarian assistance such as disaster relief, or to back up the police in domestic upheavals and riots. More recently, as peacekeeping became increasingly critical in the former Yugoslavia, several parts of Africa, East Timor and elsewhere, more and more countries opted to become peacekeepers, with a total today of 114 that have furnished forces for this purpose. In short, the challenge, in the real world if not in the academic literature, is not only to assert and maintain control, but also to develop effective militaries to implement an ever-broader variety of roles and missions.

The demands of new global threats require governments to pay attention to military capabilities and costs on a globally comparative level.

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8   Unfortunately, most of the security assistance programs also focus only on control. For our well-documented argument on this point, see Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (2006: 776-790).

Attacks by international terrorists in Bali, Nairobi, New York, Washington, Madrid, London, Amman, and elsewhere, and the launch of Washington's "global war on terrorism," have compelled militaries everywhere to become involved in fighting terrorism to a greater or lesser extent. Leaders must pay attention to matters both of control and outcomes; they must provide for security (i.e., national security and defense), while simultaneously protecting domestic democratic liberties. In our conceptualization, therefore, while civilian control is considered a fundamental aspect of democratic consolidation, and is not assumed to exist in any particular case, it is only one part of our analysis.[9]

Security Sector Reform

A reaction to the limitations of CMR conceptualization as well as an outgrowth of development theory,[10] security sector reform (SSR) –sometimes referred to as security sector transformation or security sector governance– is a relatively recent concept. SSR emerged with a claim to improve on CMR theory, which traditionally focused only on the relationship between civilians and the armed forces. Its proponents conceptualize SSR to include the more comprehensive "security community" in the process of democratization, civil-military relations and conflict prevention, on the one hand, rather than only the traditional military and police forces; on the other hand, they hoped to inspire a more complex understanding of the 21st century's multifarious security environment (Hadzic, 2004: 11-22). Proponents of SSR point out that, because today

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9   We are encouraged to see that the importance of effectiveness is forcefully advocated in a recent article by the eminent British scholar of strategy, Hew Strachan. See Hew Strachan (2006: 59-82) See, especially, page 66 for his formulation on the neglect of strategy (which is equivalent to what we call effectiveness) in much of the literature on civil-military relations.

10 The concept of security sector reform was first put forward to a larger public in a 1998 speech by Clare Short, first Minister for International Development in Britain's newly-created (1997) Department for International Development. It also emerged from the development assistance programs conducted by several European donor countries and UN agencies, as well as other international organizations, including financial institutions. See Michael Brzoska and Timothy Edmunds.

human security and development matter as much as defense against external and internal threats (of both a military and non-military nature), it is obvious that armed forces cannot, alone, handle the responses to these challenges. They argue that ensuring security requires a collaborative approach among a wider array of military and civilian institutions, which they term the "security sector." It should be noted that the focus in SSR is overwhelmingly on the security instruments themselves, and minimally on roles and missions.

For its proponents, at a minimum, the security sector encompasses "all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight," (e.g., the regular military; peace support forces; intelligence agencies; justice and law-enforcement institutions; the civilian structures that manage them; and representatives of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and the mass media) (Ehrart, Schnabel, 2005). At the maximum, the security sector includes all of the above, plus other militarized non-state groups that play a role, even if negative, in security issues, such as guerillas or liberation armies.

The Utility of SSR

SSR can make conceptual contributions where it fills in some of the gaps in the traditional concept of CMR, which had been limited to issues of military intervention in politics, democratic transitions, and the achievement of civilian control over the armed forces.

First, the SSR agenda moves away from considering the military to be the sole security provider of a nation, and seeks to advance a broad concept of a uniformed/non-uniformed "sector" or "community" whose members must work together to generate security.

Second, it takes into account the current interchangeable roles and missions of the security sector components (e.g., armed forces perform peacekeeping, police and diplomatic tasks, but also social development work; police and other law enforcement bodies perform military tasks to

safeguard society against external threats, in particular after terrorist attacks), as well as the internationalization of the security agencies (international/multinational peace support operations and/or police forces; international anti-terrorism cooperation among intelligence agencies).

Third, a SSR formulation seeks to link security sector reform directly to broader efforts toward democratization, human rights promotion, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction; in this context, it seeks to link to the larger political, economic, social and cultural transformations that accompany democratization, and encourages, at least theoretically, for civil society to be more involved in security policymaking, violence reduction and conflict prevention.

Problems with the SSR Conceptualization

Despite the fact that SSR apparently better suits the new security landscape, it has serious problems. First is the lack of consensus and understanding among SSR proponents about what the security sector encompasses. According to Timothy Edmunds, himself an early and leading proponent of SSR, a too-broadly defined security sector that includes non-military bodies (such as the health care system) which, although they may undoubtedly play an important role in the provision of security of a nation, do not involve use of force, jeopardizes the effectiveness of the security sector and its reform, because the key responsibility of the security sector is the use of force (Edmunds, 2001) Likewise, conceptualizing the security sector so that it includes all the organizations that use force, whether or not they belong to the state/government (for instance, insurgents or liberation armies) also jeopardizes the utility of SSR in that they have no affiliation with the state.[11]

Second, there is no general understanding of what SSR stands for, or what its agenda, features, challenges and effects are.[12] In our research, we

have found a huge variety of definitions of SSR, ranging from "the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control" to "the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens," which "requires broad consultation and includes goals such as strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector; professionalization of the security forces; demilitarization and peace-building; and strengthening the rule of law."[13] In the view of one SSR proponent, Mark Sedra, the "variances in interpretation of the concept have contributed to a significant disjuncture between policy and practice." (Sedra, 2006: 323-338). In this sense, while the SSR concept has been formally adopted by various countries in their official foreign policy, the ways countries implement it differs from case to case (Sedra, 2006). In addition, although several security programs were implemented as part of a SSR agenda, they actually deal with limited SSR components (e.g., police or armed forces reform) and do not embrace its vaunted holistic characteristic, thus failing to comply with the SSR normative model.[14]

Third, and most importantly for our purposes in this article, SSR lacks a consistent conceptualization, which is undoubtedly due to the diverse definitions of SSR. It is instead put forward as either a long "check list" that countries' security agencies need to complete for policy reasons (such as strengthening the armed forces, police and judicial bodies' capabilities; improving civilian management and democratic control of the

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11 Edmunds, 2001. SSR may include non-statutory security force institutions (liberation armies, guerrilla armies and private security companies); see also: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2_wulf.pdf.

12 "Resource Guide on Security Sector Reform;" available at: http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilr/security1.pdf.

13 More than a dozen definitions of SSR can be found at the following: Edmunds, "Security Sector Reform"; "the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance," David Chutter (2006); Malcolm Chalmers, Christopher Cushing, Luc van de Goor and Andrew McLean (2005); Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Working Table III, Security and Defence Issues, "Security Sector Reform", paper for the Regional Conference, Bucharest, 25-26 October 2001, at http://www.stabilitypact.org/reg-conf/011015-ssr.doc); Michael Brzoska (2000: 9); "Security Sector Reform and Governance - Policy and Good Practice", OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2004, at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf. in Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O'Brien and Andrew Rathmell, "RAND Technical Report on Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform", at "Resource Guide on Security Sector Reform", at http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilr/security1.pdf.

14 (Sedra, 2006). These are called "partial programs."

security sector; and promoting respect for human rights and transparency); (Schnabel and Ehrhart, FALTA AÑO) as a "context-depending" view (for example, developmental, post-authoritarian or post-conflict); (Hänggi, 2004: 4-9) or as a "hierarchy" (the first generation of reforms that focuses mainly on control, or the second generation of reforms that includes effectiveness and efficiency) (Edmunds, 2001). Of all the many conceptualizations we reviewed, it appears that the hierarchy approach Timothy Edmunds proposes, which acknowledges the interdependency of effectiveness, control, and efficiency, is both most useful and similar to what we term the CMR "control-effectiveness-efficiency" trinity.[15] We also find support in the leitmotif of the SSR's definitions and objectives, which also reflects exactly the elements of our trinity.

These two bodies of concepts, CMR and SSR, are the most developed literature we have found. As we have explained above, the most useful conceptualization of CMR is the trinity; we have also found support for this conceptualization in some of the SSR literature. We will now develop each of the legs of the trinity, and then illustrate them with regard to the security instruments –military, police and intelligence– and their roles and missions.

Democratic Control, Effectiveness and Efficiency: Basic Requirements

In order to capture the priorities and requirements of both democratic consolidation and contemporary security challenges, we analyze CMR according to the three dimensions of control, effectiveness and efficiency. The first leg of this trinity is democratic civilian control. It must be emphasized that democratic civilian control does not exist unless it is grounded in and exercised through institutions ranging from organic laws

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15 According to Edmunds, first generation refers to the creation of new SS institutions, structures and chains of responsibility (e.g., the establishment of civilian control over the security sector, with a clear delineation of responsibilities between relevant actors, and codification of the principles and structures for SS oversight and transparency). Second generation refers to the consolidation of those institutions, while ensuring their effective and efficient functioning, at a sustainable cost for the nation. Edmunds, "Security Sector Reform."

that empower the Ministry of Defense, oversight committees and executive bodies that direct police, to budget processes and civilian control of promotions within intelligence agencies. If these institutions are not in place and functioning, democratic civilian control is only a façade. While the range of such institutions varies from country to country, they would normally include, at a minimum requirement, civilian-led organizations with professional staffs (a Ministry of Defense for the military, a Ministry of the Interior for national police, a governor or mayor for local police and a civilian-led intelligence agency); one or more committees in the legislature that deal with policies, budgets and oversight; and a well-defined mechanism for civilians to both exert authority in determining roles and missions, and monitor such personnel matters as recruitment, education, training, promotion and retirement.[16]

The second leg of the triad is the effectiveness with which security forces fulfill their assigned roles and missions. There are several basic requirements to consider in the conceptualization of this leg. First, there is a very wide spectrum of potential roles and missions for the various security forces. Militaries participate in disaster relief, support the police in their work, collect intelligence, and engage in peace support operations, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and warfare, to name a few. Police roles and missions include crime investigation and prevention, law enforcement, community relations and much more. Intelligence personnel carry out data collection and analysis, security intelligence or counterintelligence and covert operations. Second, the roles and missions cannot be effectively implemented without adequate resources, including money, personnel, equipment and training. Third, no imaginable role or mission in the modern world can be achieved by only one service in the armed forces or one agency outside of the military, without the involvement of other services and agencies. Thus "jointness" and inter-agency coordination are indispensable. Fourth, to make things even more complicated, there are the paradoxes of evaluating effectiveness in the context of deterrence, wherein wars are avoided precisely because a country is perceived

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16 We have discussed most of these institutions in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (2006). Bruneau and Matei are currently working on a paper about the development and roles of national security councils, or equivalent inter - agency coordination institutions.

not to be vulnerable; or a youth program keeps those at risk out of a gang; or an intelligence organization supplies secret information that either prevents or induces a specific desired response, without the knowledge of anyone but those directly involved. Fifth, and finally, most of the imaginable roles and missions will be carried out within a web of coalitions or alliances. This point is obvious in the real world, where we see NATO, various multi-lateral coalitions, and the United Nations undertake difficult missions, but again is not adequately accounted for in the literature. In short, there are complicated methodological issues and nuances involved in evaluating effectiveness, and analysts must grapple with them to begin to understand what is required for the armed forces and other security forces to do what is expected of them in the contemporary world.

The third leg of the triangle is efficiency in the use of resources to fulfill the assigned roles and missions. This dimension is of course complicated initially by the wide variety of potential roles and missions, and the difficulty in establishing measures of effectiveness for any one, let alone a combination of them. Again, there are several requirements, beginning with a statement of objectives. In most instances there is no defining document, such as a national security strategy, that lists objectives and establishes preferences for one set of goals over another.[17] White Books, whose primary purpose is to develop interest and consensus among policymakers, do not qualify as national security strategies. Democratically elected governments fail to produce such documents for at least two reasons. First, incumbent presidents and prime ministers are loath to develop and prioritize national security strategies, because their opponents will quickly point out the discrepancies between the stated goals and the actual achievements. The United States only began to do so because the U.S. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, requiring the executive to publish an annual national security strategy document. Second, following from the comments above on effectiveness, an inter-agency process is necessary not only to define but also to assess priorities. This becomes even more difficult when dealing with

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17 For more on the budgetary aspect of planning, see Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, in Bruneau and Tollefson (2006: 178-207).

police forces that are not nationalized. Very few countries have such a mechanism that is anything more than formal.

It is necessary to clarify right away the conceptual distinctions between effectiveness and efficiency, as we often find the terms used interchangeably. Even a cursory review of the literature on organization theory, political transitions and defense economics shows that the terms effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy, cost-effectiveness and the like are not used in a consistent manner. We find the most agreement on the definition of "effectiveness;" therefore, it is the concept we will use. Chester Barnard, in his 1938 classic The Functions of the Executive, states: "What we mean by 'effectiveness' of cooperation is the accomplishment of the recognized objectives of cooperative action." (Barnard, 1962 [1938: 55]). The comparative politics scholar Juan Linz defines effectiveness in a way similar to Barnard's: "'Effectiveness' is the capacity actually to implement the policies formulated, with the desired results." (Linz, 1978: 20-22) We thus find enough support in the literature to stick to our conceptualization of effectiveness as the ability to actually achieve stated goals.

Efficiency as a concept is strongly associated with physics, economics and organization theory. In 1961, Herbert Simon, for example, stated: "The criterion of efficiency dictates that choice of alternatives which produces the largest result for the given application of resources." (Simon, 1961: 179. Italics in the original) Or, more recently, Arthur M. Okun wrote: "To the economist, as to the engineer, efficiency means getting the most out of a given input… If society finds a way, with the same inputs, to turn out more of some products (and no less of the others), it has scored an increase in efficiency." (Okun, 1975: 2) In reviewing thirty years of literature, we have not found a more useful definition. In the field of defense economics the term used is "cost-effectiveness," in recognition of the absence of the market and the monopoly status of a government in a given territory. While there is general recognition that the concept has to be limited in the public context, agencies must still make efforts to determine the most efficient use of resources.[18] We will deal further with this issue later in the article.

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18 The classic, which is still used today, is Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean (1978); see especially Chapter 7, "Efficiency in Military Decisions," 105 -132.

It should be obvious that the three elements of CMR must be assessed as interdependent parts of a whole. Each of the three is necessary, and individually none is sufficient. Civilian control, for instance, is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfill their roles and missions. Both control and effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost or they will vitiate other national priorities. This interdependency makes it difficult to make hard or robust measurements of change in any one dependent variable. As we shall see, once the terms are defined, we can deal relatively easily with democratic control and effectiveness; efficiency will require further consideration.

Roles and Missions in Security

What are the major roles and missions of security forces today?[19] We have determined that these fall into six major categories: 1) Fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars; 2) fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies; 3) fight international or global terrorism; 4) fight crime; 5) provide support for humanitarian assistance; and, 6) prepare for and execute peace support operations.

Roles and Missions as a Means to Control Security Services

What democratically elected leaders are concerned about in most of the newer democracies, and scholars in the conceptual literature even in the established democracies, is how to keep the armed forces under democratic civilian control; only then do they look at how to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. Why is the literature on civil-military relations so overwhelmingly focused on the control aspect? The answer is captured in the classic dilemma, "Who guards the guardians?" Any armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take over and

run that country. This is, of course, the formulation behind most analyses of civil-military relations, not only leading into military governments but also out of them.[20] The issue is all the more important in those states where the military was the government and still enjoys prerogatives it wangled from the transition negotiations. Control is also a fundamental concern with regard to the intelligence apparatus, which is required to work in secrecy, while the very foundation of democracy rests on accountability and transparency. This becomes clearer in the case of most nondemocratic regimes, military governments or former Soviet bloc countries, where intelligence served state security, protecting the authoritarian regime against the population.

As we can see from the table below outlining the six primary roles and missions of security forces, there are three main instruments that governments wield to achieve security: the military, police and intelligence services. Each of these in turn can be subdivided. Militaries are divided into services, typically army, navy, marines and air force; then further into communities such as infantry, artillery, aviators, surface warfare, etc.; and into active or reserve branches. Police forces can be divided into paramilitary units, such as carbineer or gendarmerie; national police forces, as in Colombia, El Salvador and Romania; by state or locality, and so forth. Intelligence agencies can be divided into military, national and police intelligence, to name just a few.

The next question is, how are these three main instruments of state security controlled by democratically-elected leaders? There is a wide spectrum of possible control mechanisms. Most countries, and especially newer democracies, however, are characterized by the paucity in both the number and robustness of these controls.

Control over the security services' activities may come from members of the executive,[21] legislative and judicial branches; from within the secu-

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19 For a discussion on roles and missions, and the different emphases in different countries, see Paul Shemella, in Bruneau and Tollefson (2006:122-144)

20 As Samuel E. Finer states, "Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groups are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And. They possess arms." Samuel E. Finer (2002); first published 1962: 5.

21 In the case of decentralized police forces, the executive branch includes governors, mayors, county supervisors and the like.

rity services themselves; or from external actors such as the press or NGOs. As both the primary arbiters over military forces and chief consumers of intelligence, executive-branch officials give the military and intelligence community (and the national police if one exists) their missions, basic organization, and most of their ongoing direction.[22] Legislatures normally create the key organizational, budgetary, personnel, and legal-oversight mechanisms for a state's security services, as well as balance the power of the executive branch to employ them. Independent courts may use their authority to safeguard citizens' rights against government intrusion (by, for example, an internal intelligence or police service). Internal controls can be exercised through the security services' own professional ethos, recruitment and retention policies, ethical training and institutional norms. Control may also be achieved by the division of services into multiple organizations, as is often the case with the different military services, national and local police and various intelligence organizations. This limits the ability of any one agency or service to monopolize knowledge or power. External controls in democracies include a free press, think tanks, and, especially in the case of new democracies, NGOs strengthened by overseas ties, and support for the work of monitoring their country's security agencies. Any discussion of multinational efforts such as countering terrorism and crime, or supporting peace operations must include the umbrella organizations that are charged with carrying out specific missions. These include NATO, the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States, to name just a few. While each of these organizations has its own policies and bureaucracy, national executive branches rarely cede control over their own security forces that participate in coalition operations; for this reason, the control exerted by these regional or international organizations is considered to be external.[23]

The mechanisms of control listed above are more easily employed in some roles and missions than in others. If policy makers are aware of the

spectrum of mechanisms, then they can ensure that they are sufficiently robust to exercise control.[24] Our basic argument is that control depends not so much the roles and missions that are assigned as on the mix of security instruments and how they are institutionalized. This emphasis on institutions and clarity of oversight is important since, even in a well-established democracy like the United States with its still highly contentious War Powers Resolution, the different parts of government will always struggle over who is in charge.[25] Likewise, in Romania, the effectiveness of controlling intelligence agencies is occasionally hindered by political infighting between the president and the prime minister, a consequence of the semi presidential system. This also shows that CMR is about politics more generally, or at least is strongly influenced by it.

In table 1 we seek to convey how control is likely to operate as the different instruments of security implement various roles and missions. The five mechanisms discussed above can be conceptualized as seeking to exercise control in terms of tight or permissive emphasis, specific or general oversight, and deep or shallow professional norms. Furthermore, because security as a public good or goal ranges from citizen security (local policing) right up to global security (as in PSO), we must take into account the three levels of local, national, and international contexts. The ratings of absent, minimal, high (represented by the symbols -, 0, + respectively) are intended to be suggestive of the likely impact or effect of the controls over the three instruments in the six roles and missions at the three different geographic levels. As can be seen, there are large variation on how we see the controls working. If a control mechanism doesn't apply the box is marked with -. While this picture remains admittedly rudimentary and abstract, we believe it is a useful beginning for our thinking in these terms in order to understand how control works, or does not work, in the contemporary world where security is so complex. This table is an initial effort to map out some of the relevant dimensions. Once the ratings on

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22 At the local level, again, this includes governors, county supervisors, mayors, etc.
23 The most useful sources we have found on "mandates," and thus on control, are: William J. Durch (2001); The Henry L. Stimson Center; and, Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Herkman (2006).

24 On this point, see David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas (2005).
25 The most useful recent materials on control and oversight are the Congressional Research Service reports produced since the Democrats took control of the US Congress in late 2006 and eager to begin to exercise it. See in particular - Richard F. Grimmett (2007), and Frederick Kaiser, Walter Oleszek, T.J. Halstead, Morton Rosenberg, and Todd Tatelmann (2007).

real roles and missions are reviewed, we believe some of the confusion regarding democratic civilian control and involvement in different roles and missions disappears. The emphasis in control, oversight, and professional norms are mainly defined and exercised at the national level, there is a larger role for the local level than we had anticipated, and the international level only becomes important with regard to professional norms.[26]

Table 1: **Mechanisms of Control over Security Instruments in Various Roles and Missions**[27]	Control Emphasis: Tight vs. Permissive Local National International			Oversight: Specific vs. General Local National International			Professional Norms: Deep vs. Shallow Local National International		
Wars - armed forces and military intelligence	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-
Internal wars - special forces, police, and intelligence	+	+	-	0	+	-	+	+	-
Terrorism - intelligence, police, and special forces	0	+	0	0	+	0	0	+	0
Crime - police, police intelligence, support from the military	+	0	0	+	+	-	+	+	0
Humanitarian assistance - military and police; local levels as well.	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	+	+
PSO - military, police, intelligence	-	+	0	-	+	0	-	+	+

Effectiveness in Implementing Roles and Missions

We believe that effectiveness must be determined by whether or not a state is prepared to fulfill any or all of the six different roles outlined in

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26 On the topic of the global impact on professional norms see, Anne Clunan in Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (2008, forthcoming.)

27 The sources for this table are virtually everything we do in our CCMR programs which involve education and training for all six roles and missions. See Catalogue at www.ccmr.org For a start, the relevant literature for control is that pertaining to civil-military relations, to oversight it is Feaver (2003) and the CRS reports, and for professional norms it includes Huntington (1957) and Bengt Abrahamsson (1972.)

the left-hand column of table 1, rather than by some idea of "success." Success is very difficult to measure for at least two reasons. First, success is virtually impossible to define in any of these areas, with the possible exception of lowering crime statistics such as the murder rate. Second, in all of these six areas, what matters are processes and not final results. When countries prepare to fight wars against external enemies, the greatest indicator of success often will be avoidance of armed combat, whether it is due to the perception of overwhelming force on one side, success in the use of diplomatic tools, integration into NATO or the like. The best recent example is probably the Cold War, which never did become hot directly between the United States and the Soviet Union, thanks to the mutual deterrence posed by the two sides' nuclear arsenals. In the case of internal wars, with recent cases including Colombia, Nepal, and the Philippines, there are economic, political and social causes behind the conflicts, and the security forces alone cannot resolve them. Fighting tends to drag on, for decades rather than years, and it is all but impossible to ever declare "victory." The fight against global terrorism, which differs from civil conflict in that the insurgents want to take over the state in the former but not in the latter, can be considered successful when no attack occurs. It is virtually impossible to know, however, if there was no attack due to effective security measures, or because the terrorists simply chose not to attack.

Fighting crime is ongoing, as is the provision of humanitarian assistance. Neither criminals nor natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and the like, are ever going to disappear. These are a matter of preparation and mitigation, keeping the level of crime or loss of life and property within acceptable limits (leaving aside the question, acceptable to whom?). With regard to peace support operations, the issue is similar. If conflicts between parties arise due to religious, ethnic, or political differences and require intervention by foreign security forces, the troops' presence in itself will not resolve the fundamental causes behind the fighting. Rather, they may provide some stability, separate the antagonists, and allow space for negotiations. While there may be much to say about what is required for security measures to be effective, we must nevertheless be realistic about our ability to measure it.

Based upon our studies what is required to be effective in fulfilling any of the six roles and missions in table 1 is simple to state, but very hard to achieve. First, there must be a plan in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine. Examples include national security strategies, national military strategies, strategies for disaster relief, doctrine on intelligence, and the like. We find that the formulation by prominent strategy analyst Hew Strachan captures our meaning well. "In the ideal model of civil-military relations, the democratic head of state sets out his or her policy, and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. The reality is that this process –a process called strategy– is iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means and where the result –also called strategy– is a compromise between the end of policy and the military means available to implement it." (Strachan, 2005: 52). Second, there must be structures and processes both to formulate the plans and implement them. These would include Ministries of Defense, national security councils or other means of inter-agency coordination. Third, a country must commit the needed resources, in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained forces and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine how any state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions. Of course, the instruments must be aligned properly in order to implement the roles and missions.

Efficiency in the Implementation of Roles and Missions

The third leg of our trinity, efficiency, is even more complicated to evaluate than effectiveness. While it may generally be said that efficiency means getting "more bang for the buck," or a greater return on investment, there are serious problems, noted above, with both conceptualization and measurement. First, because security is a public activity, where the so-called bottom line doesn't apply, there is no market mechanism to assign a value to whether an activity is being done efficiently –that is making a profit, or not. Second, competition in the form of a peer gov-

ernment within the same territory, is not at play. There is, then, no objective criterion for efficiency; nor, for that matter, are there incentives to achieve it. Thus the literature on private enterprises, and their efficiency measures does not apply.

There are further considerations that must be noted. As anyone who works in government is aware, public agencies and funds can be utilized as a "jobs program" to employ specific categories of people. This can run from simply keeping people employed to ensuring congressional, personal, and district prerogatives are satisfied to outright nepotism. Along the same lines, government agencies are required to buy from certain suppliers, where neither cost nor quality are the major considerations. Such acquisitions range from purchasing furniture made by prison inmates to contracting for technical support from organizations that provide money for election campaigns. All lucid persons know how these externalities function, and no conceptualization of efficiency that we have seen can adequately account for them.[28]

In some sectors of the public realm, education or transportation, for example, efficiency can be measured to some degree by kilometers of roads laid, numbers of bridges or schools built, or percentage of students who graduate, per tax dollar spent. In security, with regard to the six roles outlined in table 1, these simple measures of efficiency do not apply. How, for example, can we measure the deterrent value of the armed forces, of a nuclear capability, of submarines vs. aircraft carriers vs. squadrons or divisions? How should we assess the value of a "hearts and minds campaign" over "military force" in an internal war? Or how, in fighting terrorism, should we rate the efficiency of intelligence when success means nothing happens? Is it more efficient to use the armed forces to provide disaster relief, or to create some kind of new civilian element for this type of activity? What is the best way to determine whether engaging in PSO is good for a country such as Brazil, or is useful mainly

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28 The New York Times ran a series on government contractors. In the first article, this issue was confronted clearly in the following terms: "The most successful contractors are not necessarily those doing the best work, but those who have mastered the special skill of selling to Uncle Sam. The top 20 service contractors have spent nearly $300 million since 2000 on lobbying and have donated $23 million to political campaigns." New York Times, February 4, 2007: 24.

to demonstrate to the global community that the country has assumed its international responsibilities?

In short, the conceptualization and measurement of efficiency in the area of security is extremely problematic. What can be measured, and very scientifically, are the so-called hard data, such as numbers of tanks or airplanes produced, or number of troops trained or equipped, for a given cost. What these indicators tell us generally in terms of security and force effectiveness, however, is at the least limited and probably even misleading; policy makers nevertheless may rely on them to make decisions, when almost any imaginable issue in national security requires a broader, more strategic view than simple cost analysis. When countries do utilize these measures, and attempt to make a link with strategy or tactics, they find that there is no clear way to make direct assessments. Rather, what most government decision makers do, as a lowest common denominator, is to agree to commit some percentage of GDP or the national budget to defense.

The use of public funds in a democracy should require that government agencies carry out systematic assessments of program results and their costs. Sharon Caudle of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) works on homeland security, which encompasses all three of the security instruments of concern to this study. She has identified seven different approaches to what we call efficiency and she terms "Results Management." The one Caudle most strongly recommends is "capabilities-based planning and assessment," which she describes as "planning under uncertainty to develop the means –capabilities– to perform effectively and efficiently in response to a wide range of potential challenges and circumstances." (Caudle, 2005, quoted by the manuscript version). What we find attractive in this formulation is that she highlights two of our three dimensions, effectiveness and efficiency. Without going into great detail, she does indicate that institutions are necessary to implement such planning or, for that matter, any of the seven approaches she reviews. While this observation is obvious in the context of the United States, it might not be elsewhere; therefore we find it worthwhile to highlight some of the institutions necessary even to begin to achieve efficiency.

Since the concept of efficiency is mainly about the use of resources, institutions must deal with the allocation and oversight of these resources.

These can include what Feaver terms "police patrols" in his book on U.S. civil-military relations – institutions whose entire purpose is to track and report on the allocation of resources in other agencies of the government (Feaver, 2003) In the United States, such institutions include the Office of Management and Budget and inspectors general, and in the legislative branch, the GAO which reports to both the executive and legislative branches, the Congressional Budget Office and congressional oversight committees.

This process is not unique to the U.S. For example, Romania's legislature exercises control over the budget, which is ensured in various ways: parliament must approve the budget for the security institutions; annually it revises and adopts the Law on the State Budget, governing allocations to the security institutions; legislative committees must assess draft budgetary allocations for the intelligence agencies; parliament requires annual IC reports, usually during the drafting of the following year's allocations; and the Court of Audits, an independent body with budgetary responsibilities, functions in support of the parliament. Brazil has both an executive branch Secretaria de Controle Interno da Presidencia da Republica (Presidential Secretariat for Internal Control) which oversees the executive's budget in general, and the Tribunal de Contas da Uniao (National Audit Board) which oversees budgets for the judicial branch.

Tradeoffs

It should be obvious that the three elements of CMR must be assessed as indispensable parts of a whole. Each of the three is necessary, and individually none is sufficient. Civilian control, for instance, is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfill their roles and missions. Both control and effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost or they will limit other national priorities. This interdependency makes it difficult to provide absolute measurements of change in any one dependent variable. There are, however, identifiable tradeoffs in each of these categories.

Democratic Control vs. Effectiveness

Although it may seem counter-intuitive, increased democratic control (direction and oversight) tends to improve effectiveness in military, intelligence and police forces. While too much direction and oversight obviously can hamper security services' capabilities or reveal sources and methods, implementing "good" control, i.e., instituting control and oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness. For example, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act both reinforced democratic civilian control and mandated jointness for the military services in the United States. Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the four U.S. military services could not operate effectively together; operations in Grenada in 1983, and elsewhere, illustrated how this lack of interoperability actually caused casualties. Although some interoperability issues certainly remain, U.S. forces have been more effective at fulfilling their various roles and missions since this level of democratic control was enacted. Operation Desert Storm, operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and the initial combat success in Iraq bear witness to these improvements.

Romania provides a telling example of how democratic control can improve effectiveness in an intelligence organization. As Romania transitioned to democracy, its intelligence structure consisted of as many as nine agencies with little oversight, direction or clear roles and missions. As both the executive and legislative branches implemented control mechanisms, the intelligence community in Romania began to improve. For example, the executive branch created the National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), which organizes and coordinates all intelligence activities.[29] The CSAT reviews and endorses national security and military strategies, as well as intelligence products from the agencies. Similarly, legislative control and oversight of intelligence agencies, which is exercised through specialized parliamentary committees, include: establishing the legal framework, structure and mandates of intelligence agencies; monitoring the implementation of legislation; providing funds for intelligence, and holding the agencies accountable for their budgeting and spending; reviewing intelligence agencies' activity; and utilizing intelligence for national security. Together, the CSAT and parliament have whittled the Romanian intelligence community from nine organizations to six; improved recruitment, training and professionalism; and clarified the mission of each agency. As a result of these measures, the Romanian intelligence apparatus is both more effective and more efficient.[30]

Along with legislative activities, democratic policing involves action by the executive (including mayors, and governors in the case of federal systems) and judicial branches, from within the police forces and, in particular, from civil society, where there is naturally a greater emphasis on the direction and oversight of police activity than on the military. Case studies in Colombia, Brazil and Chile show that the institution of democratic reforms and control mechanisms produces more professional, trusted and effective police.[31] It is increasingly clear that a combination of these control mechanisms will lead to more democratic control and effective security forces.

Democratic Control vs. Efficiency

While improved democratic control generally improves effectiveness, efficiency is not always a byproduct of increased democratic direction and

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29 The CSAT consists of: the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Administration and Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Industry and Resources, the Minister of Public Finances, the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), the Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, and the Presidential Adviser on National Security. Upon invitation by the president, the chairmen of the two parliamentary chambers, the governor of the National Bank, the heads of the other intelligence agencies (including departmental heads), and the chairmen of the special parliamentary committees may participate in CSAT meetings.

30 For more information, see Cristina Matei, in Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz(2007); also see Cristina Matei (s/f).; Valentin Fernand Filip, "The Intelligence Phenomenon in a Democratic Milieu. Romania – A Case Study," at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/romania/filip.pdf, and Larry Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania" DCAF Working Papers, 2003, at www.dcaf.ch/pcaf/ev_geneva_021002_prog_watts.pdf

31 See Frühling (falta año:31-38; and Bailey and Dammert (2005: 21). While Frühling sees all the cases cited as relatively successful, Bailey and Dammert argue the effectiveness of the Colombian police has corruption and scandals.

oversight. In most countries, there are several different branches of the military, along with various intelligence organizations. This diversity fosters improved democratic control in that no single security apparatus monopolizes all state knowledge or power; yet it often leads to duplication of effort, bureaucratic competition among various entities vying for government resources, and the increased potential for corruption by those in official positions. The reality is that direction and oversight are costly. If security services never had to testify before legislative committees, provide data to oversight organizations, reform their institutions when problems are uncovered, or improve professional standards, then all resources might be used to obtain the best military equipment, provide the most intelligence product or increase the number of police on the streets.

Despite this, it is not always the case that increased democratic control will reduce efficiency. Police reform, in particular, has improved efficiencies when a holistic approach to democratic control is adopted. As noted above, especially in the Chilean and Brazilian cases, community policing efforts, while initially difficult and costly, have helped create efficient policing in the long term because citizens worked to support their own security.

Effectiveness vs. Efficiency

Tradeoffs between effectiveness and efficiency can be illustrated in many ways. Improvements in management and leadership that vastly improve effectiveness often yield positive results in efficiency, as fewer resources get consumed.

It is more often the case, however, that an operation may be effective while being quite inefficient. Launching numerous expensive missiles at a single target and destroying it "multiple times" is clearly effective but not at all efficient. Similarly, allocating a large police force in response to a spate of crime in a certain area may cause crime to go down, but overtime and cost may disproportionately go up.

Conclusion

Our purpose in this article is to synthesize conceptually some of what we have learned "from the ground up" in CCMR programs. The overwhelming focus in the classical literature on civil-military relations is on civilian control over the armed forces and intelligence services. As a result of our research, however, we have expanded our analysis and programs to include a trinity of factors that affect civil-military relations: control, effectiveness and efficiency. We also note a substantial residuum in the more focused research on security sector reform to support our conceptualization of a trinity. To achieve its purpose, each leg of the trinity requires particular institutions responsible for implementation and oversight, at the local, national and international levels of operations. Although we consider the common applications of efficiency to be something of a "red herring" in the field of security, this is not to suggest that there is not a real need for a set of institutions to allocate and oversee the application of resources in this complicated area of government behavior.

While there is still concern in many of the newer democracies with achieving democratic civilian control over the armed forces, there is generally little awareness of the institutions necessary in fact to achieve and exercise this control. There is increasing awareness today that control, in and of itself, is not much use if the instruments of security-military, police, and intelligence – are not effective in achieving the roles and missions assigned them by the civilian leadership. If the concern were limited to traditional wars, the issue would not be particularly serious, given how rare interstate conflict has become in most regions of the world. The contemporary spectrum of domestic roles and missions, such as fighting crime and providing humanitarian assistance after natural disasters, however, receives close attention; international roles that include fighting against terrorists or providing capable peacekeepers also raise considerable expectations of effective security forces. It is amazing that the literature on the issues covered here is not richer and more robust, given the centrality of security to societies throughout the world, and the enormous resources many governments commit to ensuring it. We believe that more work on the concepts of control emphasis, oversight, and professional

norms will allow democratic decision-makers to better understand what is required to best prepare their countries, and their security forces, to implement the roles and missions they assign them. We hope that, with this first effort at conceptualization and integration, others, particularly those involved in security policy at whatever level, will further elaborate and correct our approach.

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